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“Latin America” has become an anachronism.
Latin America is dead.1

People from diverse geo-political, historical, and racial standpoints understand the meaning of the
word America in correspondingly diverse fashions. In the sixteenth century, Europeans coined the
name America to refer to the single continent they had ‘discovered’ overseas. Since then, power
relations shaped systems of knowledge that, in turn, provided a myriad of significances to the word
America. In the contemporaneity, the term came to signify the country of the United States of
America (U.S.) alone. This paper analyses the processes that transformed the meaning of America
from an entire continent to one of the nations this landmass encompasses. I denounce the role that
USAmerican academia played in this process of geographical and epistemological manipulation and
propose a model that identifies the dismembering of the continent of America in three different
stages.2 Each stage corresponds to a different USAmerican project of territorial, military, political, or
economic expansion and evinces specific rationales. The first stage corresponds to the continental
split, in which North and South America were conceptualized as two different continents rather than
two parts of the same continent. USAmerican intellectuals initiated this schism in the nineteenth
century and cemented it in the beginning of the twentieth century to legitimize U.S. expansion
towards parts of Central America, the Caribbean, and adjacent territories. The second stage is the
cultural split, that ignored the previous partition of the continent into North and South America and
reconceptualized it into the new categories of Anglo and Latin America. It has roots in the first
decades of the twentieth century, but both academia and the general public systematically
incorporated the division after World War II. The cultural split makes part of a project that isolated
the U.S. as a global hegemonic power. And, finally, the third stage is the global divide between the
‘West and the rest,’ a product of Cold War and Area Studies that degraded Latin America to a nonWestern status in the second half of the twentieth century. I argue that, while both the state and
academia combined forces to achieve the two first stages, ‘Western scholars,’ mostly from the U.S.,
hold exclusive authorship of the third stage.3
Anglophone historiographies of the ‘Americas,’ especially of Latin America, are the basis for this
paper. I focus on literature published in English for two main reasons. Firstly, because most of the
discourses that produced and justified the conceptualizations of the different Americas originated in
the Northern hemisphere of America and, therefore, compose the core object of inquiry of this paper.4
Secondly, the ultimate legitimization of these discourses depends on not only producers, but
consumers. Scholarship in English, an academic lingua franca, is universally consumed, but literature
in other languages reaches a significantly smaller audience in Anglophone countries. Many were
voices in Spanish, Portuguese, or many other languages spoken throughout the continent, that tried to
redress conceptualizations about the continent summarily imposed by Europe, at first, and,

37

DISCIPLINARY FRONTIER(S) BETWEEN THE “AMERICAS”

posteriorly, the U.S.5 Suffice it to say that, while the U.S. adopts the geographical model of seven
continents, with North America and South America as distinct continents, most countries in Latin
America adopt the six-continents model, in which America remains only one.6 This foundational
discrepancy in perspectives of the world can elucidate the power of geolocation in a system of
knowledge, constituting a proof for the deliberate annihilation of epistemes originating in the
peripheries of the so-called ‘Western World.’
Embracing peripheric epistemes, this paper adopts the six-continental model in which America
constitutes one single continent. More than a stubborn act of resistance, the adoption exposes how
language affects perceptions of the territory and the artificiality and fragility of a segregation that
started and developed upon a set of ideological, political and economic interests of a few statemen,
tycoons, and even scholars. Likewise, in this paper, America does not refer to the U.S., but to the
landmass that sits on both hemispheres and extends from Cape Froward in Chilean Patagonia, to
Boothia Peninsula in northern Canada. By proposing the three stages of the detachment of the
Americas and analyzing the rationale for each, this paper aims to contribute to ongoing debates on
the importance of hemispheric histories and the role of migrations in the scholarship of America. It
also urges for bringing the literature of Indigenous homeland to the fore. Above all, this paper raises
questions about the future of the literature on Latin America in the U.S. and abroad. Furthermore, it
exposes the appalling absence of questions about the origins, causes and consequences of the many
disfigurements that America endured. Scholars have overlooked entire avenues of inquiry for more
than a century because of the biases above which the scholarship of America was built in the U.S., the
current epicenter of academic production.
Epistemic structures have been able, so far, to keep ‘Americanists’ and ‘Latin Americanists’ in their
respective isolated departmental realms. Recent academic production, however, points to an
unsustainable maintenance of these disciplinary frontiers.7 Latin Americanists who focus on
migrations or Americanists dealing with frontiers have been making abundantly clear the obvious
intertwined common history of the ‘Americas.’ Likewise, historians working on transnational
narratives of processes of independence throughout America, both to the north and south of the
Equator, also point to the same shared historical contexts. The studies of Amerindians and the
African Diaspora also offer transnational and hemispheric perspectives that surpass present-day
geographical limitations often nonexistent in the period when the stories took place. In a similar
fashion, literary theorists have been expanding Hemispheric Studies in insightful directions.
An extensive list of inconsistencies marks the different ways in which America was butchered during
the last 150 years. For the continental split, zero degrees latitude is not decisive when it comes to the
countries that constitute each continent, despite the obvious reference to the hemispheres where the
landmasses are located. Whereas North America is entirely situated in the Northern Hemisphere,
South America spans the equatorial line across both hemispheres, which indicates the arbitrariness of
the separation. Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guyana are entirely located to the north of
zero degrees latitude, whereas Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador are partially located in the Northern
Hemisphere. Similarly, U.S. conceptualizations of Anglo and Latin America do not correspond to any
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concise set of criteria. Latin America was a project that the French designed to compete with England
and the U.S. for commercial privileges over the former Iberian colonies.8 Eventually, the label came to
signify everything that rests to the south of the border between Mexico and the U.S. However, these
territories do not share a common “heritage from the inhabitants of ancient Latium” as conceived in
the nineteenth century. In Central America and the Caribbean, the legacy of former Dutch, Danish,
and even English colonies was forcibly bent into the label ‘Latin,’ a categorization so problematic that
Caribbeanists need to explain, in every essay, the difference between territories such as West Indies
and Latin America.9 And last but not least, the contributions of African and Indigenous peoples were
arbitrarily removed from the equation ‘Anglo – Latin’ throughout the continent.10
The validation of such unsolved inconsistencies in the division of America in the literature of Latin
American Studies, namely by U.S. scholars, is telling. Instead of challenging the divisions,
USAmerican academia fully adopted and even expanded these categories, creating still more
frontiers, with all their irregularities, contradictions, and prejudices. More than a political divide,
thus, the division of America is an incessant sequence of postulations within a context of situated
knowledge and power. Insofar as the wall separating the U.S. and Mexico remains on paper (or
dreams), the frontier between Anglo and Latin America belongs more to perceptions and unilateral
prejudices than natural, human, or physical geographical features. However, the ethereal nature of
this border is not less effectual than a material one. Ultimately, this frontier is more powerful and
operative than the North and South America divide has ever been. The heritage of colonial policies
and cultures, ethnic and racial conflicts and, essentially, unbalanced economic and political power
determined a much more functional divide of the Americas. The hegemonic global presence of the
U.S. as of the twentieth century allowed for the association of both terms - Anglo and North
America - with Uncle Sam’s lands. Despite the colossal differences between North and Anglo
America, the two names are often used interchangeably. North America is used to designate the U.S.
in spite of this region’s original definition composed of Mexico, Canada, Central America, and the
Caribbean; likewise, Anglo-America is used to designate the U.S. and Canada in spite of the Frenchnot-Anglo part of Canada. Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean occupy the awkward
position of being simultaneously part of North and Latin America.
To have an idea of how institutionalized the division is, and not only in academia, the United
Nations classify territories according to the so-called “M49 Standard”. It stands for “Standard
Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use" and is the list of geographic regions used by the Statistics
Division for United Nations’ publications and databases. According to the United Nations, the
world is divided into “Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania.” Americas, in turn, are divided
up not into North and South, but into “Latin America and the Caribbean,” and the odd term
“Northern America,” (my emphases). The institution acknowledges that the continent of North
America comprises ‘Northern’ America, Caribbean, and Central America only in a footnote, while
proclaiming ‘Northern’ America as the region composed by Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint
Pierre and Miquelon, and the U.S.11 The repercussion of such understanding is enduring in any
field of knowledge or governmental policy-making, in that the demographics of the planet are
conceived upon this taxonomic structure. As a center of enunciation under strong influence of the
U.S., the United Nations impose a particular perspective of the world that is not globally
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unanimous and, in turn, is grounded on the geographical manipulations that this paper seeks to
analyze.
The institutional definitions of different regions of the Americas, therefore, are a collage of biases,
racial conflicts, histories of dominance, and ideological disputes that are everything but concise.
Through the cracks of the metageography of America, ideological constructs emerge in the form of
spatial manipulations.12 This paper demonstrates how USAmerican academia became a center of
observation that, by maneuvering spatial configurations of the continent, served as a key instrument
in the consolidation of the U.S.’ hegemonic power.
First Stage: the continental split
The first step towards establishing the hegemony of the U.S. in America was the rupture of the
continent, initiated in the nineteenth century and consolidated in the first decades of the twentieth
century. USAmericans clearly understood and incorporated the logic of colonialism that drove
European powers, especially Britain, and converted it to its own benefit. To achieve modernity as the
British did, the U.S.’ politicians and intellectuals alike were quick to perceive they needed the same
tools, projecting itself as a model for others and placing the nation as a global epicenter of
knowledge.13 Power dynamics in the continent of America, formerly polarized into European
metropoles and colonies, gave way to a new composition. The U.S. maintained the old structure
based on the relationship between dominant and dominated, or power differential, by ascending to
the leading role that once belonged to Europe.14 The country started a process of appropriation of
the epistemic base that Europeans held, and adapted it to the circumstances of the Western
Hemisphere. Splitting up the continent was less a matter of geography and more of power, if not
exclusively. In similar fashion, calling themselves ‘America’ was less about the name and more about
the power of naming. With the consolidation of the U.S. as a new epicenter of knowledge came the
authority to reshape and rename parts of the continent according to their own standpoint and
interests.
After the ‘discovery’ of new lands across the Atlantic in the fifteenth century, European conquerors
created a subject they named the ‘New World,’ despite the innumerous people that already lived in
those lands for centuries. It took hundreds of years for European intellectuals and philosophers to
absorb, understand, classify, and incorporate the new lands to their threefold continental system. The
base of the European conceptualization of the world had to be revisited, including previously rooted
ontological, religious, and philosophical understandings of the T-in-O model, a circle (the O) in which
a contained T created three areas, each symbolizing one of the continents of Europe, Africa, and Asia.
By splitting the world up into what Europeans knew – the ‘Old World’ and the ‘New World,’ language
reflected Eurocentric perspectives that became standard and shaped the way humanity made sense of
our planet.15 Seeking moral justification for imperial mercantilism by claiming superiority over any
other civilization, Europeans imposed their language, religion, and customs in nearly every place they
were able to arrive. Likewise, they believed in their divine right to subject other peoples to their will
and plunder foreign territories as they saw fit.16 The very representation of Europe in the center of
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world maps was born in the period and remains the norm.
Under the European standpoint, colonialism was the umbrella under which the lands across the
Atlantic Ocean were covered. The continent of America was a whole possession of Europe and the
division of the territory served the only purpose of attributing ownership of each area to its respective
metropole. Despite the division of the continent into English, French, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and
Danish colonies (among others), America was seen as one of the four continents then known.17 For
Europe, the criteria to compartmentalize territories in America scantily took local characteristics into
consideration, despite acute differences between peoples, indigenous political divisions, or even
natural and environmental features of the new lands.
In the process of independence for the European colonies in the Western Hemisphere, a strong feeling
of ‘new worlders’ versus ‘old worlders’ emerged in America. Many leaders and intellectuals, namely the
Creole elites, turned to the name of the continent of America to define themselves in opposition to the
ideology and interests of figures of the Old World. ‘America for the Americans’ was a sentiment
shared, although with many nuances, by people all across the continent. Figures that range from
Simón Bolívar to Toussaint Louverture to Thomas Jefferson all envisioned different models for an
independent America.18 It was precisely along this period of constructing national identities that the
division of America came to be. Since the earliest beginnings of the USAmerican Revolution, a
‘constant invention of itself’ informed continental designs from statesmen of the U.S., and it always
included the annexation of Spanish American territories and subjugation of non-white people.19

Figure 1. George Frederic, Lotter and Matthaus Albrecht, A New and Correct Map of North America, with the
West India Islands (detail),1784, engraving. Courtesy of Musselman Library.

41

DISCIPLINARY FRONTIER(S) BETWEEN THE “AMERICAS”

North and South America as subcontinents is not an invention of the U.S. The tradition of referring to
the North and South America in cartographic documents dates to at least 1626.20 But the division of
America into two continents was a product of the construction of a USAmerican identity that involved
strategical economic and political decisions. The origins of the ‘Great Divide,’ as economist Ricardo
Salvatore puts it, has roots in the eighteenth century but flourished in the following century.21 A map
dated to 1784, less than a decade after the independence of the U.S., is unequivocal evidence of the
rationale that informed the separation of America into two distinct continents. The map, that alludes to
the U.S. of North America (my emphasis), signals the U.S.’ efforts in the consolidation of the continent
(Figure 1).22
A few decades later, in 1823, the U.S. officially articulated their role as the new metropole of the
Western Hemisphere. The idea of America as two continents was unmistakable when President James
Monroe, together with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, imposed their right to protect the
Americas from European colonialism, offering military support for newly independent republics.23
The message says: ‘The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have
assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any
European powers.’24 (my emphases of the pluralized words). And, to that, he later added that ‘[t]he
political system of the allied powers is essentially different… from that of America’ (my emphasis),
indisputably referring to the U.S (Morison, 1924, 27). The message was abundantly clear: the U.S. had
appropriated the name of the entire continent for themselves and, additionally, split the continent into
two halves.
Since the first half of the nineteenth century, intellectuals from both the northern and southern halves
of the continent debated the invention of two discrete Americas, be it in approval or disapproval.
South Americans promptly noticed and denounced what the U.S. understood as ‘America.’25 But the
term was more than a label that evinced embryonic imperialistic designs as early as the nineteenth
century. It was an idea in which the U.S. conceived itself as an ‘island’ of freedom, democracy and
wealth, the beacon of the Western Hemisphere in contrast to the tyranny, ignorance, and
backwardness of the Spanish colonies, later called “the Prescott’s paradigm.”26 Prevalent in the history
of the ‘Americas,’ the Monroe Doctrine profoundly altered the destiny of the geography of the
continent and the relationships between its different – and hereafter segregated – halves. The verbiage
that president Monroe used in his historical declaration in 1823 is an unambiguous manipulation of
the geographical concept of continents. Moreover, the reconfiguration of the European conception of
the continent was an act of defiance. Americans defined what America is.
Constituting an artificial construct, the continental split posed the question of where to locate the
dividing line between the two continents. For nineteenth-century geographers, natural features such
as geological characteristics and physical formations prevailed over human geography for the
definition of continents. The shifting location of the border, that migrated from the northern to the
southern edge of current-day Panama, is evidence of the strong political and economic motivations
that the outlining of the frontier involved. Undoubtedly, the shape of the continent contributed to the
frontier’s design. Along the north-to-south direction, the isthmus of Panama corresponds to the
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narrowest mass of land in the entire continent and, on a map, looks like a natural geographical
division. However, where exactly should the line be traced? The border between North and South
America is an entire country, in the 400 miles (640 Kilometers) extending east-west from the border
of Colombia to that of Costa Rica. The ‘line’ became, therefore, the political border between Panama,
(the southernmost North American nation,) and Colombia, (the northernmost South American
country.) Needless to say, the frontier was only established in its current location after the political
and territorial definition of the region, which occurred after Panama’s independence from Colombia
in 1903, with active participation of the U.S.
At the speed of a signature on an independence declaration, the borderline between North and South
America moved 400 miles southward. As early as 1708, maps clearly represented the frontier between
the then subcontinents of North and South America in the northern border of Panama.27 The fact that
the border moved after the country’s independence, including it in North America instead of South
America, points to the imperial aspirations of the U.S. The ‘naturalness’ with which many see the
location of this frontier, therefore, falls apart. Why did the border move to include Panama in North
America? The politics involving these issues lay outside the purview of this paper. However, the case of
the shifting frontier demarcating the division between North and South America reveals not only the
interests of the U.S. in the longitudinal territorial expansion, but also makes evident the complicity of
USAmerican scholars with this division. The fact that the U.S. managed to effectively build and control
the Panama Canal after a French failed attempt is emblematic enough. Dominated by Europeans since
the sixteenth century, the area had been one of the most important trade routes of the world and now,
through the creation of a Canal Zone, the U.S. asserted political control over a ten-mile strip
surrounding the new canal. A sumptuous engineering project and one of the seven marvels of the
modern world, the canal became the very symbol of the prominence of the U.S. as a global power and
represented a significant victory over the Old World’s intervention in America.28 Panama would not,
under any circumstances, be located in the neighbor ‘South America,’ but under the wing of the U.S. in
North America.
The U.S. wanted to secure their hegemony over the territories of Central America and the Caribbean,
pursuing their expansionist destiny while compromising any project of intervention from other nations
interested in the region. Expansionist policies over the continent, ever-present in the history of the
U.S., were particularly acute during the presidencies of William McKinley (1897 – 1901), Theodore
Roosevelt (1901 – 1909), William Howard Taft (1909 – 1913), and Woodrow Wilson (1913 – 1921).29
England, France, Spain, Russia, Holland, and other European powers were ready to either maintain or
reap the riches from colonies in Central America and the Caribbean. The geographical inclusion of
these regions in North America, figuratively closer to the U.S., empowered the justification of
USAmerican intervention over countries such as Puerto Rico, annexed in 1898, as well as the creation
of USAmerican protectorates. At the turn of the twentieth century, Cuba was the first, followed by
Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua (Delpar 2008, 26).30 The location of
protectorates in North America served to tighten their ties to the U.S. more effectively.
Only a few years after Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, in which he credited the
USAmerican ideals of freedom and political equality to their unprecedented expansion to the west, the
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U.S. was seeking new frontiers for their insatiable hunger for the ‘beyond.’ With the conquest of the
territories to the west completed, the alternative was to look for lands and markets to the south.31 The
map A Thing Well Begun is Half Done (1899) makes evident the expansionist project of the U.S. over
Central America and the Caribbean (Figure 2). In the picture, meant to represent the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War of 1898, President William McKinley stands above Mexico, with one foot over
recently annexed territories from that country. Assisted by Uncle Sam, who brings tools from
Washington DC, President McKinley looks at the “proposed Nicaragua canal,” eager to connect the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, while a line of cargo ships, bearing ostensive USAmerican flags and loaded
with “American goods for foreign countries,” await at both sides of the narrow landmass. The flags are
also planted in the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, among other territories. Uncle
Sam, to the front of the prominently depicted Capitol, advises: “Finish the canal, McKinley, and make
our national expansion complete in your first administration” (my emphasis). The massive structure in
Washington DC, therefore, provided the apparatus necessary to USAmerican expansion, while the
president carved opportunities and performed the hard work.

Figure 2. Victor Gillam and Sackett & Wilhelms Litho. & Ptg. Co, “A Thing Well Done is Half Done,” Judge
Magazine (October 7, 1899). Courtesy of Artstor.

The national expansion was strongly tied to the conquest of Middle America and the control of trade
routes and export markets alike. The picture portrays President McKinley as a worker with one hand
rolling up the sleeves and the other holding a pickaxe. He is metaphorically reshaping the geography of
the continent and building a new commercial and political scenario for the globe. The angle used to
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represent the U.S. and their most recent conquests is also telling. South America is only scantly
represented in the picture, although definitely present, while North America takes visual prominence in
the south-north perspective, looking gigantic and isolated as an independent and ever-growing
superpower. McKinley’s sight is focused on Middle America, however, his position facing south
suggests a future interest in a continued walk towards South America. The expression ‘half done’ of the
title refers to the other half of the hemisphere.32 While the expansion over the northern half of America
seems complete or, as the title asserts, ‘well done,’ the picture suggests the south as the next step
toward USAmerican expansion in the Western Hemisphere.
Many historians acknowledge the contribution of geographers to the process of expansion of the U.S.
over the continent of America from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, and not only because they
physically produced cartographic documents. Academia played a key role in legitimizing this division
with the ‘rediscovery of South America’ in the beginning of the twentieth century. The ‘newly created
continent’ became the mecca of geographers all over the U.S., who gathered useful information about
its social, economic, agricultural, commercial, and cultural tracts.33 Under the benevolent label of PanAmericanism, early twentieth-century geographers had a twofold utility: they worked for the
USAmerican government to facilitate commercial and diplomatic relationships and assert the U.S.
hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, by turning their attention almost exclusively to
South American territories, scholars dissimulated imperialist designs over Central America and
Caribbean. South America was ‘different,’ the ‘other,’ the ‘exotic,’ whereas Middle America was just an
extension of the U.S., composed of weak states that depended upon the U.S.’ political and military
interventions.34 The Good Neighbor Policy (1933), promulgated during the presidency of Theodore
Roosevelt, is an irony. Firstly, the policy was created to bring the two Americas closer, with the
initiative of the very nation that had artificially split up what was once one continent only. And
secondly, the name conjured up a subtle message that redefined the two halves in a distanced and cold
relationship: the ‘Americas’ were not even sisters, but mere neighbors.
The continental split seems the most natural and inoffensive of the three stages of the division of
America, but it constitutes the foundation for the intellectual production of the twentieth century in
the U.S. The entire system of higher education was born on the base of the two Americas, North and
South, meaning that departments in universities, library catalogues, museum collections, and a whole
system of referentiality took off under different labels and, thus, followed distinct paths since the
dawn of the twentieth century.35 This was the rationale that informed scholars, from historians and
literary theorists to geographers, from anthropologists and archaeologists to social scientists, since the
very beginning of American-born literature. The division had long-lasting impact on scholars and laypublic alike, in that it changed the course of history in structural and ineradicable ways.36
Second Stage: the cultural split
The second move in the process of affirmation of the U.S. as a global power occurred after World War
II. It was an emblematic period in which shattered European powers offered little to no threat to the
U.S.’ hegemony over not only the continent of America, but the whole world. Through the categories
of First, Second, and Third Worlds, the Cold War reconfigured the geography of the planet. The U.S.’
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concerns turned to the defense of its own model, based upon democracy and capitalism against Soviet
authoritarian communism. Finally, and indisputably, in the second half of the twentieth century, the
U.S. took over the leadership that once belonged to European nations, especially England and Spain.
The U.S. perfected the concepts of modernity, individual liberties, and the free market that would
characterize the’ Western World.’ The ‘American way of life’ was used as propaganda and an object of
desire for many other countries. On the other side of the spectrum, Latin America came to signify the
opposite to USAmericans: a dystopic space acting as a counterpoint to the utopia that supposedly
characterized the U.S.37 Additionally, after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the U.S. government started to
picture Latin America as a hotbed of communists and, therefore, a threat to USAmerican civic values.
Academia became engaged in a ‘civilizing mission’ alongside U.S. governmental agencies. Language,
not maps, consolidated the cultural split. From the 1940s on, the term Latin America started to be
systematically employed, isolating the U.S. and Canada in the Anglo side, and jumbling all the other
nations of the continent together in the other, the Latin side. Latin America gradually replaced the
formerly mainstream terminologies Hispanic, Iberian, or Spanish America.38 With the new design of
the continent, the U.S. put more emphasis in the separation of their territory from the rest of the
continent. While intellectuals focused on Latin America elaborated dependency theories, a brutal
growth of higher education institutions and students’ enrollment in the U.S. allowed Americanists to
embark on an inward crusade of extraordinarily narrow narratives about their own history.39 Latin
Americanists dealt with everything else in the continent. Academia, therefore, reinforced the binary
of the singular ‘America,’ versus the plural ‘Americas.’40 The grammatical number is not arbitrary nor
coincidental. Whereas scholarship on the U.S. tended to emphasize the triumphs of a unique and
superior society, Anglophone scholarship of the ‘Americas’ had to deal with the overgeneralization
that the label ‘Latin America’ imposed.
The overwhelming percentage of doctoral students who specialized in USAmerican history in the U.S.
in the twentieth century caused a deficiency of professionals in other regions of the world. The
creation of Area Studies during the Cold War sought to balance the parochialism that characterized
USAmerican academia and foment knowledge on foreign lands strategic to the maintenance of the
U.S. hegemonic power.41 However, be it in scope or methodologies, Area Studies cemented the
distinct historiographical paths that Americanists and Latin Americanists have taken since its
creation, distancing the fields to a seemingly unsurmountable degree. Evidently, in the U.S., American
Studies do not pertain to Area Studies, a fact that denotes the epistemic central place on which
USAmerican academia has placed itself. In his 2003 work American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer
and the Prelude to Globalization, Neil Smith argues that “power always expresses spatiality,” defining
who sits at the center and becomes normative.42 Continents gave place to regions as units of inquiry in
world geography, and Area Studies flourished in USAmerican academia together with the ‘cultural
turn’ in the humanities. The combination of the legacy of the first wave of intellectuals working on
South America and Middle America and the emergence of Area Studies significantly fabricated,
imposed, and articulated differences within America like never before.43
The dichotomy reached the general public during Cold War, while the frontier between North and
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South America became less and less important for USAmerican foreign policies and academics alike,
accompanying the decline of geography as a discipline in the educational system of the U.S. The
systematic discredit of geography was part of a project that sought to redesign the world and keep a
distance from undesired influences.44 Outside of academia, the split between Anglo and Latin
America was seldom challenged, in part due to the geographical illiteracy of the general public.45
According to any residual memory of the continents, the division between Anglo and Latin America
is completely artificial. The ‘physical’ border lost its visual impact, and cultural features that
supposedly incorporated and distinguished the U.S. from the rest of the continent, such as racial
demographics and colonial heritage became the new frontier.46 Simultaneously, a homogenizing
project for the nation-state celebrating an American patriotic identity was at full steam. The flag,
displayed in every classroom, countless front porches, and even the moon, became an ever-present
visual element nationwide. Artists popularized the anthem in different musical genres. The English
language and sports such as baseball were extolled while ‘foreign’ manifestations were repelled. For
instance, pedagogy of the period argued that bilingualism damaged children’s intelligence,
contributing a ‘scientific’ justification to discriminate against Spanish-speakers, among other ‘secondclass’ citizens that conserved their foreign mother-tongue on USAmerican soil.47
The Cuban Revolution of 1959 only exacerbated the binaries between capitalism and communism in
the continent of America, provoking a radical shift in the way the U.S. perceived the lands to the
South of the Mexican border. During the Cold War, the division of North and South America turned
out to be incapable of keeping the U.S. ‘geographically isolated’ from the underdeveloped countries of
North America. The U.S.’ way-of-life, politics, economy, religion, and, obviously, system of
knowledge, should be immediately discernible from Mexican, Central American, or Caribbean
undesirable characteristics. As much as Europe held the power to name the new lands to the west of
the Atlantic Ocean as the ‘New World’ over the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the U.S. led to the
split of America into ‘America’ and ‘Latin America.’ Ultimately, the new division consolidated the
exceptional identity that the U.S. fabricated for itself.
Third Stage: the exclusion from the ‘Western World'
The final step of the establishment of the U.S. as the hegemonic power of the ‘Americas’ (and the
world) was the exclusion of Latin America from the so-called ‘Western World.’ In contrast to the first
two movements, academia under U.S. leadership was the sole responsible party for this maneuver. It
was up to scholars from institutions in the U.S. to create the criteria, analyze the data, and classify
Latin America on a taxonomic limbo between the civilized modern realm that allegedly defines
Europe and the U.S. and the supposed dark, backward, and ignorant instances of the undeveloped
pockets of the planet. The stereotypes and generalizations created by these scholars grew to be
normative in academia, and the rest were considered an aberration.48
Before the final decades of the twentieth century, USAmerican and European scholars placed the
‘Western World,’ supposedly a reference to the lands to the west of the center of the standard world
map, completely apart from the geography of the Western Hemisphere. Intellectuals such as Arnold
Toynbee and Samuel Huntington conceived a different set of criteria to divide and classify world
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regions according to civilizations rather than continents.49 By rating Latinos as a distinct civilization,
this view simultaneously incorporated and legitimized the division between Anglo and Latin America.
Ultimately, from their already consolidated hegemonic location within a system of knowledge,
USAmerican scholars imposed a radical division of the world into the ‘West and the rest,’ excluding
Latin America from ‘Western civilization.’ As a method of othering that Anglophone scholars invented,
this dichotomous discourse serves no purpose other than ranking nations according to their wealth and
compliance with USAmerican standards of democracy and freedom. The same set of criteria has
created divisions for the last decades: First, Second, and Third Worlds; developed and underdeveloped
worlds (the latter quickly relabeled as ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ due to its unmistakably derogatory
tone); core, semi-peripheries, and peripheries. The nomenclature of these labels might offer some
variations, but they share the same taxonomic rationale.
Since the elaboration of these systems of classification, the U.S. replaced Europe as the exemplar
epicenter of virtue, culture, and development. Although the cartographic representation of the world
positioning Europe at its center in the globe’s imagery, some alternative models have emerged from
newer taxonomies, reflecting current dynamics of power and wealth in the world. It is hard to ignore
the centrality of the U.S. in the map The rich world, developed world, first world or Western world by
another name: the walled world (2019). The image, published in the website Big Think, is a powerful
visual message of the position that the U.S. enjoys – physically and metaphorically – in the presentday world map (Figure 3).
The theoretical absurdity that the division of the world between a supposed ‘Western World’ and
whatever else there is, offers some humorous non-academic visualizations. Western Civilization Map
(2019) is a diagram that circulates in many different websites and brilliantly exposes the rationale that
informed such classificatory system, with the U.S. as ‘the Westest,’ Mexico as a ‘Hard NO’ and South
America as ‘Not West Enough’ (Figure 4). Likewise, countries such as South Korea and Japan, The
theoretical absurdity that the division of the world between a supposed ‘Western World’ and whatever
else there is, offers some humorous non-academic visualizations. Western Civilization Map (2019) is a
diagram that circulates in many different websites and brilliantly exposes the rationale that informed
such classificatory system, with the U.S. as ‘the Westest,’ Mexico as a ‘Hard NO’ and South America as
‘Not West Enough’ (Figure 4). Likewise, countries such as South Korea and Japan, representatives of
‘The East’ for thousands of years, appear as ‘Honorary Westerners.’ In spite of the jokes the
conceptualization of the ‘Western World’ inspires, a significant part of Anglophone academia takes
these matters seriously. Anglophone intellectuals and theorists not only foster but legitimize the ideas
that led to this map. USAmerican scholars are the protagonists that uncontestably manufacture
continental, regional, civilizational, and organizational categories to classify and divide the world.

48

HEMISPHERE

Figure 3: TD Architects, The rich world, developed world, first world or Western world by another name: the
walled world (detail), 2019, Digital image. In: https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/walled-world

Figure 4: Unknown author, Western Civilization Map, posted 2019. Digital image. From: JordanPeterson,
Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/JordanPeterson/comments/benp7w/western_civilization_map/.
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The theoretical absurdity that the division of the world between a supposed ‘Western World’ and
whatever else there is, offers some humorous non-academic visualizations. Western Civilization Map
(2019) is a diagram that circulates in many different websites and brilliantly exposes the rationale that
informed such classificatory system, with the U.S. as ‘the Westest,’ Mexico as a ‘Hard NO’ and South
America as ‘Not West Enough’ (Figure 4). Likewise, countries such as South Korea and Japan,
representatives of ‘The East’ for thousands of years, appear as ‘Honorary Westerners.’ In spite of the
jokes the conceptualization of the ‘Western World’ inspires, a significant part of Anglophone academia
takes these matters seriously. Anglophone intellectuals and theorists not only foster but legitimize the
ideas that led to this map. USAmerican scholars are the protagonists that uncontestably manufacture
continental, regional, civilizational, and organizational categories to classify and divide the world.
However, Americanists and all ‘other Americanists’ inevitably clash in their scholarly discourses. As of
2020, the Latino community corresponds to 18.3% of the U.S. population.50 Transformed in
absolute numbers, this percentage accounts for approximately seventy million people. The official
projected number of Latinos will account for twenty-five percent of the U.S. population by 2050. 51
Will the idea of the ‘Western World’ survive after the consolidation of the new demographics?
Will Latin America survive as a label? Will Latinos and Latinas blend into USAmerican society as
Irish and Italians did before them? Even though racial criteria are knowingly artificially and
socially constructed, the darker complexions and the brown eyes of many Latinos and Latinas play
a significant role in the process of assimilation of immigrants.52 At any rate, how will academia
respond to the new demographic scenario?
Conclusion
In 1932, in the heyday of Pan-Americanism, president of the American Historical Association Herbert
E. Bolton, called for a hemispheric history of the ‘Americas’ to correct the historiography of the U.S.53
Even though historians largely ignored the message throughout the last decades, The Epic of Greater
America still produces minor effects.54 Bolton envisioned an intercontinental avenue of inquiry that
included Latin American narratives in the history of the U.S. Four decades later, the field of Atlantic
World History tickled the idea of deconstructing laudatory discourses on the U.S. history through
transnational frameworks linking the territories that comprise the Atlantic basin. However, both
Bolton and Atlanticists failed to effectively remove the U.S. from the epicenter of historical narratives
or displace it as a center of enunciation. Bolton was interested in the different perspectives that Latin
America would bring to the historiography of the U.S., and never questioned the USAmerican concept
of America or showed interest in the historiography of other American nations. Similarly, Atlantic
scholarly production kept the normativity of ‘The North’ untouched. The British Atlantic quickly
dominated the publishing market due to the parochial profile of the Anglophone public. The very
definition of Atlantic World History – the interconnected history of the ‘four’ continents situated in
the corners of the Atlantic Ocean, points to a foundational segregation between the ‘Americas’ that
has persisted since the eighteenth century.
The fact that the history of Europe, Africa, and the ‘Americas’ together gained the prominence that the
individual history of America as a continent never had speaks volumes about USAmerican academic
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biases toward the ‘Americas.’ Historical narratives that take place before the manipulation of the
continent in the nineteenth century cannot even be considered ‘shared’ history between North and
South America, but one unique history. However, even pre-Colombian history was anachronistically
split up in departments of American Studies or Latin American Studies. America is a continent that
was undermined in its entirety by the arrival of Europeans both in its north and south shores.
Following the genocide of countless native peoples, in a matter of five decades Europeans had explored
a vast extent of the continent from one extreme to the other in the longitudinal direction. The whole
continent experienced corresponding processes of colonization by European powers. America as a
whole was the final destination for millions of enslaved Africans along centuries, participating in one
of the most heinous chapters of the history of humanity. Likewise, different American nations had an
indissoluble common or intertwined intellectual, political, military, and diplomatic history, facing
comparable challenges and walking analogous trajectories. Peoples, goods, and ideas have been
circulating throughout the north and south portions of the continent incessantly.
Scholarship would greatly benefit from epistemic revisions grounded on the awareness of the
geographical manipulation of the continent of America. Theorists focused on migration already build
many bridges between histories of the U.S. and Latin America, bringing enough evidence of the
intertwined and shared history of the continent within the core of USAmerican identity tropes.55
Adrián Burgos, for example, shows the pervasiveness and key role that Latinos played on the most
‘American’ of sports, baseball.56 Publications rescuing the participation of Latinos and Latinas in the
history of the U.S. since the nineteenth century is on the rise and prove that immigration is not a
recent phenomenon whatsoever, despite political discourses that insist on the novelty of the issue. In
2004, for instance, the journal Radical History Review devoted an entire volume to discuss the concept
of Latin Americanism and its future in the U.S., pointing to a growing awareness of the scholarly
community on the matter.57
According to anthropologist Eric Wolf, when Europeans first arrived in these lands, they considered
the natives of America as a “people without history”.58 Five centuries after, we remain so. A
comprehensive history of the continent of America is still waiting to be written. It will happen only
when scholars rescue Latin America from the linguistic confines of USAmerican academia and bridge
the disciplinary frontiers that made America the ‘Americas.’
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